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Introduction
The analysis of the intergenerational transmission of economic status is closely related to the discussion about the rising income inequality in many countries as it shows in how far the current income distribution is fostered by inheritance of the social status from parents to children.
In Germany, second-generation migrants, i.e. the children of migrants who are born and raised in Germany, make up a large and growing share of the population.
In 2010, 19.3% (15.7 million) of the German population had a migration background of which almost one third was German-born (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011) . But while traditional immigration countries like the US, Canada or Australia register a successful integration of second-generation migrants, they lack behind in terms of education and labor market outcomes in Germany (Fertig and Schmidt, 2002; Riphahn, 2003; Algan et al., 2010) . This study analyzes whether a high degree of intergenerational persistence impedes the integration of second-generation migrants as disadvantages faced by the first generation of migrants are transferred to the second. This would explain the divergence in the economic outcomes of the offspring of natives and migrants.
Intergenerational earnings persistence emerges as several factors link the earnings of parents to the earnings of their children. First of all, there is a transmission of genetics, behavior, cultural traits, and environmental factors like e.g. family reputation or connections from parents to children. In addition, parents' investment in human capital contributes to earnings persistence as parents with high earnings are better able to finance and support their children's education which in turn leads to higher earnings of the children (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Chadwick and Solon, 2002) . Consequently, earnings persistence results from the fact that parents transfer a certain endowment, which contributed to their own earnings in the first place, to their children. Therefore, it is an important policy task to promote equality of opportunities within the society by creating an institutional setting (like e.g. the educational system) which compensates for a lack of such a material and immaterial endowment among children with a disadvantaged background.
In a comparison of the intergenerational earnings mobility between natives and migrants, it has to be taken into account that there are many factors which lead to differences in the earnings transmission between these two population groups. Native and migrant parents differ in observed and unobserved characteristics. Migrant parents may put, for example, a larger emphasis on their children's education than natives as the migration decision may have already been driven by expectations and hopes about their children's future possibilities in the host country. This would increase the earnings mobility of migrants if compared to natives. However, a lack of familiarity of migrants with the host country's language, the educational system and/or a lack of connections and access to important networks may reduce migrants' earnings mobility. Therefore, in theory, it is a priori unclear whether migrants are more or less mobile than natives. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed.
While Aydemir et al. (2009) find no significant differences in the intergenerational earnings elasticities between migrants and the native population in Canada, other studies for Germany and Sweden find immigrants to be less mobile than their native counterparts (Yuksel, 2009; Hammarstedt and Palme, 2006) .
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There are, however, not only differences in the earnings transmission between natives and migrants but as well between men and women. Most empirical studies find weaker intergenerational relations between daughters and their parents if compared to sons (Couch and Dunn, 1997; Chadwick and Solon, 2002; Raaum et al., 2007) .
2
Reasons for these differences may lie, for example, in assortative mating and in labor supply decisions of women (Raaum et al., 2007) . Assortative mating describes the tendency of two people with similar characteristics to marry. In terms of family earnings, a strong degree of assortative mating can increase earnings persistence as persons with a high earnings potential are more likely to marry persons with a high earnings potential likewise. This kind of mating enhances the intergenerational transmission of the earnings potential. As educational institutions are important meeting places for potential spouses, the early tracking in the German educational system is likely to benefit assortative mating in Germany. Ermisch et al. (2006) provide evidence for this hypothesis as they find that 40-50% of the covariance between parents' and children's family income in Germany can be attributed to the spouse.
Assortative mating may be even more influential among migrants because they may not only appreciate similarities in sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics like education, health or occupation, but as well similarities in the ethnic background. As several studies have shown that interethnic marriages have a positive impact on the educational outcomes as well as on the income of migrants (Meng, 2005; Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2011) , interethnic marriages may also influence the earnings mobility.
In the literature, there is, however, no consensus about whether endogamous marriages are more important among male or female migrants. Using U.S. data, Chen et al. (2007) find migrant women to be more mobile in terms of marriage and earnings, while Chiswick and Houseworth (2008) find female migrants to be less likely to marry a native partner than their male counterparts. The latter could be explained by, for example, cultural norms which tie daughters relatively more to their family home. In sum, this example shows that even the gender differences in the intergenerational earnings mobility might differ between natives and migrants.
To shed more light on this issue, the study at hand takes up two current developments in the literature by expanding the analysis of the intergenerational earnings mobility simultaneously to women and migrants. The objective of this study is to find out whether high earnings persistence prevents a faster integration of secondgeneration migrants in Germany and whether sons and daughters of migrants are equally affected. For this purpose, two approaches are used. First, intergenerational earnings elasticities are estimated. This is done at the mean as well as along the earnings distribution by using OLS and quantile regression methods. Second, the relative earnings mobility is analyzed. Thereby, mobility is measured as intergenerational changes in the relative earnings positions.
Empirical Strategy
The key issue in the analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility is to find an appropriate earnings measure -irrespective of whether mobility is analyzed in terms of individual or household earnings. The most desirable measure are lifetime earnings of parents and their children. However, as lifetime earnings are rarely observable -in particular lifetime earnings of parents and children at the same time -they are often proxied by annual earnings.
While in the textbook error-in-variables framework errors in the measurement of the dependent variable (children's earnings) lead simply to more noise, errors in the right-hand-side variable (parents' earnings) lead to an attenuation bias in OLS estimates. Therefore, many empirical studies use averages of parents' earnings to reduce the attenuation bias (Zimmermann, 1992; Black and Devereux, 2010) .
However, if the relation between current income and lifetime income varies systematically over the life cycle, the assumptions of the textbook errors-in-variables model do no longer hold (Haider and Solon, 2006; Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006; Brenner, 2010) . In this case, measurement errors in the independent as well as in the dependent variable can lead to inconsistency of the estimates. Furthermore, it is no longer clear whether measurement errors induce an amplification or an attenuation bias. For this reason, some studies advice likewise against taking single year observations of children's earnings like it has been done in most previous research (Yuksel, 2009; Nybom and Stuhler, 2011) .
Due to life cycle variations in income, the age at which earnings of children and parents are observed is an important factor in estimating intergenerational earnings mobility. Earnings at some ages are better suitable as proxies for lifetime earnings than earnings at other ages. Persons with high lifetime earnings tend to enter the labor market later but exhibit faster earnings growth. Thus, considering earnings at an early stage of the career may lead to an underestimation of lifetime earnings whereas taking earnings at a very late stage may overestimate lifetime earnings of persons with relatively high lifetime earnings. Furthermore, Brenner (2010) shows that lifetime earnings profiles differ between natives and migrants. One explanation for this heterogeneity in earnings growth rates is that migrants undergo an assimilation process during which they acquire country specific human capital and which leads to higher earnings growth rates if compared to natives. Brenner shows that the attenuation bias over the life cycle is significantly larger among migrants than among natives. This could lead to the spurious conclusion that mobility is relatively larger among migrants. Even though Brenner confirms that taking averages of earnings contributes to reducing the attenuation bias, he warns that point estimates still need to be interpreted cautiously.
To reduce a potential bias in the estimation of the intergenerational earnings mobility, some adjustments are made. First, the sample of children is restricted to 25-to 45-year-olds. In this age, most persons -independent of their educational level -have entered the labor market. The parents' age is restricted to 30 to 65 years. termined by the earnings of the parents. Therefore, high elasticities imply a low degree of intergenerational mobility. Age is included in the model to control for potential life cycle variations in earnings of the four population groups (native men, native women, migrant men and migrant women). The age is the average age of children and parents when the earnings are observed. As in most families the father is the main earner in the parental generation, the average age of the father is taken representatively for the parental age when household earnings are considered.
To find out whether the intergenerational earnings elasticities are significantly different between the population groups, a fully interacted model is estimated.
The baseline model is
where ℎ are the average weighted earnings of individual in family ℎ, ℎ are the average earnings of the parents of person , ℎ is the average age of the father, is a female dummy and a migrant dummy. The standard errors are clustered on the family level because the sample includes families with more than one child and it is not likely that the residuals are independent across siblings.
As the degree of integration of the migrant population may influence the earnings mobility, the analysis is expanded by including different indicators of integration like ethnic marriages and the parents' years since migration.
The intergenerational earnings elasticities are estimated by OLS and by quantile regression estimation methods. The latter provides insights into variations of the degree of mobility along the earnings distribution of the children. As the German migration history is largely determined by the recruitment of low-skilled workers, a large share of first-generation migrants can be found at the lower end of the earnings distribution. Therefore, it is of particular interest whether the offspring of this important group of migrants is able to overcome their initial disadvantage. 
Data
The analysis is based on individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP).
5 The SOEP is a longitudinal study of private households which started in 1984 and which samples more than 20,000 persons each year, including
Germans, foreigners and recent immigrants. The data structure allows a direct link-5 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v3.0 (Nov 2010) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn(2010) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
age between children and their parents.
The sample includes German natives, first-and second-generation migrants. A second-generation migrant is defined either as a person who is born in Germany but who does not hold German citizenship or as a migrant who arrived before the age of 6.
6 In addition, this group comprises persons who are born in Germany,
hold German citizenship and whose parents are both immigrants. The sample is restricted to persons living in West Germany and Berlin as very few migrants live in East Germany.
Using many waves of panel data bears the risk of attrition bias, i.e. a systematic drop-out of individuals out of the sample, which leads to biased estimation results.
In particular among migrants, remigration or emigration of the most ( transmission from the parents to the children. However, wages are only observable for employed persons. In particular for women, this restriction leads to a lower number of 6 This is a common proceeding as young immigrants have the same educational background than their native counterparts.
7 This results from the fact that second-generation migrants are at least 25 years old and the parents arrived either before birth of the child or at the latest when the child was 6 years old.
8 The hourly wage is generated by dividing the monthly gross labor income by the working hours in the respective month.
observations and the sample is likely to constitute a selected subgroup. Furthermore, including zero earnings observations for non-employed persons may increase the lifecycle bias in estimated earnings elasticities (Brenner, 2010) . Therefore, zero earnings observations are excluded from the analysis to make women's and men's earnings more comparable. As the data includes too few migrant mothers with non-zero wages, this study is limited to the analysis of the relation between fathers' and children's individual wages. While the employment rates of female second-generation migrants are already relatively low, this is even more pronounced in the parental generation.
This could be partly explained of the immigration policy in the course of immigration due to family reunification which limited the labor market access of spouses and led to, for example, particularly low employment rates among Turkish women (Liebig, 2007) . This restriction is regrettable as it is likely that mothers and fathers exert a different influence on their sons and daughters (see, for example, Couch and Dunn, 1997) .
For this reason, the analysis uses the equivalent household income as the second earnings measure. The equivalent household income is the overall household income divided by equivalence weights.
9 The household income has the main advantage that persons with zero individual income can be included in the analysis. Furthermore, in contrast to most other studies, the analysis is not exclusively focused on the relationship between children's and their fathers' earnings as the fathers' household income comprises as well mothers' earnings. The main disadvantage of this earnings measure is that it cannot be differentiated in how far the intergenerational mobility is influenced by direct earnings transmission from the parents to the children and in how far it is influenced by the choice of the partner and/or the household composition.
Furthermore, children who live in the same household as their parents and share the same household labor income have to be excluded.
10
9 The weights used are the modified OECD equivalence weights which assign a value of 1 to the household head, a value of 0.5 to each additional adult member and children age 14 or older, and a value of 0.3 to each child below age 14 (OECD, 2005) .
10 This could lead to biased results if children living with their parents might differ significantly from children living on their own. However, comparing the intergenerational wage elasticities between these two groups does not reveal significant differences. The children are on average 29 to 31 years old and the fathers 47 to 53. The share of married persons is higher among migrants. Looking at the sample considering the household income, 44% (35%) of native women (men) are married, whereas the respective share of migrants is 59% (48%). Within the group of married persons, the share of native Germans who are married as well to a native German accounts for 74% among women and for 79% among men. Also more than half of the married secondgeneration migrants are married to a partner with the same ethnic background (54% of women and 52% of men). The respective shares of married persons in the sample considering the individual wage information are lower, whereas the share of persons in ethnic marriages is higher.
The average equivalent household income (hourly wage) varies between 19,221 e (10.69 e) for migrant women and 26,757 e (14.21 e) for native men. There are three striking features with respect to both earnings measures. First, men report higher earnings than women.
11 Second, natives have on average higher earnings than migrants. And third, all four population groups have lower earnings than their parents, whereas this gap is less pronounced among migrants. Finally, Table 1 reveals that the children's average incomes are on average based on 5 to 8 earnings observations. The respective numbers for parents are 12 to 16. The second column in Table 2 presents the results including a marriage dummy.
Results

Intergenerational Earnings Elasticities
12 The negative and significant coefficient signifies that the earnings elasticity of migrant women -which is a combination of all four coefficients -is lower than the combination of the coefficient of the father's income and the two interaction terms, i.e. the coefficient of "a female migrant men", which does not exist as a reference group.
The coefficients of the marriage dummy are larger for women than for men what indicates that marriage reduces the mobility of women relatively more if compared to men. But while the coefficients of the marriage dummy per se are not significantly different from zero, the negative coefficient for female immigrants becomes even larger in magnitude. This shows that the comparatively high degree of mobility among migrant women is driven by single migrant women. The estimated income elasticity for single second-generation migrant women is even negative.
13 This is also in line with previous studies which have found negative earnings elasticities for daughters (Couch and Dunn, 1997; Yuksel, 2009 ).
To test the initial assumption that the earnings mobility may be influenced by the choice of the partner, the model specification in the third column focuses on married persons only and differentiates between ethnic and interethnic marriages. The results in column 4 reveal that the years since migration have a negative but decreasing effect on the income elasticity of migrant children. Thus, the longer the father has been in the host country, the more mobile are the children. This effect does, however, not differ between migrants sons and daughters as the coefficients of the interaction between the father's years since migration, the father's income and the female dummy are close to zero and not significant. Table 3 presents the respective estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities based on individual incomes, namely the hourly wages. The coefficient of the logarithm of the father's wage accounts for 0.242 and is statistically significant. Thus, the intergenerational wage elasticity is larger than the household income elasticity. This is probably due to the fact that individual wages reflect better the earnings potential of a person which is transferred from the parents to the children in the form of education, connections, etc., whereas the household income is influenced by many additional factors like labor market participation decisions, the choice of the partner and the household composition. The coefficient of the female dummy is close to zero and insignificant which means that there are no significant differences between native men and women. The results show further that migrant men have on average a significantly higher wage elasticity than native men. Migrant women have a negative coefficient which is, however, not significantly different from zero.
Pairwise comparisons confirm that migrant women are not significantly more mobile than the other population groups (Table A. 
1).
It is noteworthy that while marriage reduces women's mobility relatively more than men's mobility in terms of the household income, the reverse is true in terms of the individual wage (column 2). As before, interethnic marriages increase women's mobility less than men's mobility (column 3). However, none of the relevant coefficients is significantly different from zero and thus the data do not provide empirical evidence that marriage per se or the type of marriage influence the degree of mobility in terms of wages. Finally, the results in column 4 show that there is also no evidence that the father's years since migration have an impact on the wage elasticity. The coefficients are negligible in magnitude and not statistically significant.
When comparing the results of the household income mobility and the individual wage mobility, it has to be taken into account that the analysis of the wage elasticities is based solely on persons who are employed. This group constitutes probably a very selected subgroup as, for example, only the most successful migrants might find employment or only those married women who have a relatively high earnings potential might decide to work. Therefore, the estimated wage elasticities are not representative for the overall population. This self-selection could explain why neither the marital status nor the father's integration have a significant impact on the earnings mobility of those persons who have already (successfully) entered the labor market. Furthermore, it could explain the opposite effect of marriage on the wage elasticity if compared to the effect on the household income elasticity.
As it is of particular interest whether low-earnings migrants are able to overcome their initial disadvantage, the earnings elasticities are reestimated using quantile regression methods. Table 5 As can be seen in Figure 1a , there is a downward trend in the intergenerational household income elasticity of natives. This signifies that children in lower earnings quantiles are less mobile than children in higher earnings quantiles. In particular, the estimated quantile regression coefficients of native women are above the confidence interval of the OLS estimate below the 20th earnings quantile.
14 Among migrants, the estimated income elasticity is lower than the OLS estimate for women with incomes below the median income and higher than the OLS estimate above the median income, whereas the reverse is true for migrant men.
But even though migrant men at the lower end of the earnings distribution have higher earnings elasticities than migrant men at the higher end of the earnings distribution, Table 5 shows that at the 10th quantile of the household income, migrant men are not significantly less mobile than native men. Only at the median income, migrant men are indeed significantly less mobile than native men. Table 5 shows further that the coefficient for migrant women is negative and significant at the 10th income quantile. A pairwise comparison of the earnings mobilities confirms that second-generation women are significantly more mobile than native women and migrant men at the lower end of the earnings distribution. 15 Migrant women do, however, not differ significantly from native men. In summary, these results weaken concerns that in particular low-earnings migrants reveal a low degree of intergenerational mobility if compared to natives. In contrast, second-generation migrant women at the lower end of the earnings distribution are relatively mobile.
14 The large confidence intervals of the quantile regression coefficients are due to the low number of observations in each earnings quantile. Therefore, statements about the significance of the differences between OLS and quantile regression coefficients are problematic.
15 Results of the pairwise comparison of the quantile regression coefficients are available from the author upon request. Table 5 presents the shares of persons in different earnings quantiles conditional on the age (see Section 2). It is noticeable that the share of migrants -among children as well as among parents -in the lower earnings deciles is higher than the share of natives. Above the median income (wage), the share of migrants almost never equals or exceeds the share of natives in the respective earnings decile. Table 6 presents the share of persons who have improved their relative earnings position compared to their parents ("upward mobility") and the share of persons who have worsened their relative earnings position ("downward mobility"). Women exhibit a higher degree of upward mobility than men, whereas this difference is larger among migrants than among natives. While second-generation migrant women show less downward mobility than migrant men, the degree of downward mobility is comparable between native men and women. These patterns are even more pronounced among married persons.
Relative Earnings Mobility
To analyze whether the differences in mobility between the population groups are significant, a linear probability model of the probability of having a higher (lower) earnings position compared to the parents is estimated.
16 Again, the particular influence of ethnic marriages on the earnings mobility is taken into account. Tables 7 and 8 present the respective results. Table 7 shows that, on average, there are no differences between the four population groups in the probability of upward mobility in terms of the household income.
All the coefficients are close to zero and not statistically significant. Controlling for marriage, column 2 shows that married men have a significantly lower probability to improve their relative earnings position than single men. The coefficient of the female dummy is negative, but small and insignificant. Even though the coefficient of the interaction of the female and the marriage dummy is positive and significant, this does not allow direct inference about the difference between single and married women or the difference between married men and married women as all three coefficients have to be interpreted jointly again. Therefore, columns 3 and 4 consider married persons only. First, these results reveal that the differences between married men and married women are not significant. Second, controlling for the type of marriage shows that, with exception of native women, persons in interethnic marriages are more likely to improve their earnings position than persons in ethnic marriages. These differences are, however, only significant for native men. Among native women, the reverse is true, i.e. native women with a native spouse are more likely to improve their earnings position than native women with a non-native spouse.
Columns 5 to 8 present the respective results for the individual hourly wages.
Column 5 shows that migrants are on average more likely to improve their relative earnings position than natives. There are no significant differences in the probability of upward mobility between men and women. As before, there is neither evidence that the marital status nor evidence that the type of marriage influence the relative mobility in terms of individual labor earnings. which mainly confirm the results of Table 7 . There are few differences between the population groups and if at all migrants are less likely to worsen their relative earnings position than comparable natives.
Conclusion
This study analyzes gender differences in the intergenerational earnings mobility of second-generation migrants in Germany and compare these to German natives.
The results show that there are no large differences in the intergenerational earnings elasticities -neither between men and women nor between natives and migrants. Gender differences are relatively more pronounced among the migrant population whereby migrant women reveal on average a higher degree of mobility than migrant men. Against the initial hypothesis, not migrant women but, if at all, migrant men in ethnic marriages are relatively less mobile than comparable migrant men in interethnic relationships. Furthermore, the parental integration measured by the father's years since migration increases the mobility of migrant children significantly.
The explanation for this could be that better integrated parents are better able to support their children and therefore increase their earnings potential. The quantile regression results confirm the main OLS results and moreover weaken concerns that in particular low-earnings migrant are less mobile than comparable natives.
In terms of relative mobility, there are also few differences between the population groups. There is a slight tendency that migrants are more likely to improve their relative earnings position from one generation to the next and less likely to worsen their relative earnings position.
In summary, the results of this study suggest that second-generation migrants are on average as (im)mobile as the native population. Thus, low earnings mobility is not a migrant-specific issue in Germany. However, given the more unfavorable economic background of second-generation migrants, these results indicate as well that migrants are not able to overcome their initial disadvantage and considerably improve their earnings position if compared to natives. NOTE.-Graphs made using the user-written Stata command "grqreg" (Azevedo, 2004 
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